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The theory of comparative capitalisms
and the possibilities for local variation
G L E N N M O R G A N
Warwick Business School, The University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL,
UK. E-mail: glenn.morgan@warwick.ac.uk.
Globalization is placing European societies under pressure to change. In the
1990s, researchers identified particular national models of capitalism. These were
argued to consist of integrated and reinforcing institutions that created specific
rules of the game for economic actors. These rules favoured the development of
globally competitive firms in particular sectors where the institutional
characteristics of the home society facilitated the building of distinctive types of
capabilities. In this view, a global division of labour was developing based on
institutional differences. Thus, national policy makers needed to reinforce
institutional advantage and institutional specialisation by incremental
adaptations to globalization. Reforms needed to be consistent with the underlying
model of capitalism. This paper challenges such a view. It argues that firms are
highly innovative and use institutions not as constraints but as resources that
enable them to build new capabilities. It further argues that institutions are more
diverse, malleable and multi-levelled than the national models perspective
recognizes. Thus, options for change are much broader than predicted by the
path-dependent national models framework. Indeed, the main issue for European
societies in response to globalization is to ensure diversity and experimentation
rather than simply seeking to reproduce a dominant logic.
Introduction
European societies are engaged in a process of economic restructuring as global
competition becomes more intense. Globalization, characterized in economic
terms by the opening of national markets, the deregulation of business activities,
the construction of new technologically enabled global supply chains and the
intensification of competition between firms has challenged existing institutional
arrangements across Europe. Firms are now able to identify new locations outside
Europe where goods and services can be produced more cheaply at increased
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levels of quality. They can move to locations where they pay much lower wages
and benefits, receive generous tax breaks and subsidised infrastructure, and
are subjected to fewer regulatory demands. Nor is this simply an issue for
manufacturing industry. Knowledge-based activities can be reorganized and many
elements, including high level research and development, can now be transferred
and outsourced away from Europe into Asia, most obviously China and India. For
example, Novartis, the Swiss Pharmaceutical company, has recently announced
it that it intends to make Shanghai one of its three big research hubs alongside
Cambridge, USA and Basle, Switzerland. In these circumstances, what is left for
the countries of ‘old Europe’, the heartland of the EU project? Will employers
force potential employees into more flexible labour market arrangements in a ‘race
to the bottom’ in terms of employment rights and welfare systems? Will Europe
lose its comparative advantages in terms of skills, knowledge and learning and
find its economic position weakening as the new economies of Asia and the
Americas grow and develop?
A range of options arise in academic and policy considerations. The first, which
is traditionally represented with the European Union by the British government,
is that Europe needs to open itself further to market competition in order to get
rid of underperforming firms and to grow firms in new expanding sectors. The
implication of this model, which has been expressed frequently by Tony Blair and
his chancellor, Gordon Brown (and supported implicitly and sometimes explicitly
by the US), is that the continental European economies need to dismantle their
regulated and ‘ossifying’ economies and undergo rapid institutional change to turn
them into open liberal market systems where national protection for firms and for
employees has been removed.
A contrasting perspective to this argument is to emphasize that there is a path
dependency to processes of economic change and European societies will not
lightly give up their distinctive social and political systems. Instead, there is likely
to be a complex amalgam of processes of adaptation and change. Societies are
likely to respond to challenges in ways that reflect their history and their particular
social structure and institutions. Therefore, the opening of markets and the
development of capital and labour flexibility will be adapted and shaped by
particular national circumstances. In this paper, I pursue this issue in greater
depth. In particular, I distinguish between two types of analyses of these pressures,
both of which emphasize path dependency and the role of institutions. However,
they differ in certain important respects. The first type emphasizes that European
societies should become more focused on their particular historically developed
institutional strengths. Policy should, therefore, aim to strengthen existing
institutions and the complementarities between them. Institutional change should
be incremental and carefully calibrated to ensure that the system as a whole
retains its distinctive strengths. The second approach suggests that, as a result of
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processes associated with globalization, European societies are becoming more
internally diverse in terms of their economic organization. Further, this diversity
can be seen as a source of strength because it enables new combinations and
innovations to emerge. Crouch1 has labelled this as the difference between the
‘pedigree’ and the ‘mongrel’. The pedigree in animal husbandry is bred to do one
thing extremely well; but it is only one thing and if this is not required the pedigree
is superfluous. The mongrel, by contrast, has attributes from different sources that
may come in useful in different conditions. In the first part of this paper, I critically
examine the ‘pedigree’ model, arguing basically that it is an inadequate
representation of the empirical reality of societies and their processes of change.
In the second part of the paper, I examine the ‘mongrel’ model. I suggest that this
is a more appropriate perspective for understanding societies and how they change
in response to internal and external pressures. In the final section of the paper,
I consider the policy implications of these arguments, suggesting that from both
a political and economic point of view, the central goal of policy should be
concerned with supporting and stimulating diversity within a framework of broad
social consensus on legitimate forms of economic activity.
Pedigree models of national capitalisms
The 1990s saw a revival of interest in the comparative study of capitalisms. With
a number of honourable exceptions (e.g. Shonfield2) in the Cold War period, the
clash between the communist states and the West tended to conceal the extent of
difference between capitalist economies. Almost as soon as the communist system
collapsed, authors began to explore differences between capitalist societies in
much more detail.3–6 These authors suggested that different forms of capitalism
institutionalized particular economic rules of the game that shaped the strategies,
structures and competitiveness of firms. Thus, societies developed institutions that
reflected their own particular way of organizing economic relations (from systems
of ownership through to patterns of industrial relations). These, in turn, derived
from the social compromise between, in particular, labour and capital that had
been constructed most noticeably in the post-war period but had deeper roots
in the mode of transition from an agrarian, pre-industrial economy. Competition
in open global markets brought firms from different institutional contexts and with
consequently different capabilities into a level playing field. In those industries
(mostly manufacturing, e.g. autos, electrical, chemical and other forms of
engineering) where such a level international playing field more or less existed
in the 1960s through to the 1980s, firms from certain countries out-competed those
from others with a consequent impact on internal patterns of wealth, inequality,
welfare and social order more generally in the different societies. The result was
a growing international division of labour with firms from particular societies
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specialising in distinct sectors where the national institutional conditions gave
them a particular advantage.
Hall and Soskice7 made the clearest theoretical statement of this position in their
distinction between liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market
economies (CME). Liberal market economies, driven by market relations in the
provision of capital and labour and in the construction of inter-firm relations and
based on a short-term logic, encourage firms to prosper in sectors where rapid and
recurrent restructurings of assets is likely – low end manufacturing, industries
undergoing major technological restructuring (such as telecoms and the internet)
and high end services (consulting, accounting, financial markets). By contrast,
coordinated market economies are characterized by negotiation between the main
actors, i.e. between owners and managers, between managers and employees and
between firms. Coordination brings gains in terms of collective incremental
upgrading and improvement, although the process is likely to be slow. Sectors of
manufacturing (e.g. cars, engineering) which are characterized by the competitive
need for continuous improvement are supported by these processes of
coordination. Thus, CMEs could be expected to grow globally competitive firms
in these sectors. CMEs and LMEs would specialize in different industrial sectors
and this would be reflected in the sorts of firms that were globally competitive
in those countries.
In this view, both LMEs and CMEs are structurally integrated forms of social
organization that create strong path dependencies that generate advantages for
actors in those systems. Actors in these systems, according to Hall and Soskice7,
are incentivized to follow the rules for two reasons. Following the rules reduces
search costs and enables actors to assume a common framework of understanding,
thus facilitating economic interaction. Failure to follow rules leads to sanctioning
that has an economic impact. Sanctioning may be informal, e.g. in terms of loss
of reputation or it may be formal, e.g. expulsion from an employers’ federation.
Actors are locked in to a certain model of economic coordination that creates a
path dependency. Institutions reinforce each other, creating institutional
complementarities that also generate economic efficiency gains for those who
continue to abide by the rules. External changes are therefore unlikely to lead to
major internal changes, and more likely to be absorbed into the existing model
(for similar perspectives, see Amable8 and Whitley9).
In general, these authors share a similar focus on the ‘system’ nature of
institutional arrangements and their impact on firms, focusing on how different
institutions (the financial system, the labour system, the contracting system)
reinforce each other and lead to a particular way of doing things in particular
societies. This process of reinforcement (although relatively under-examined) is
seen as having economic and political benefits for social actors who therefore
continue to reproduce the institutions, thus creating a path dependency. Hall and
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Soskice, for example, state that; ‘The firms located within any political economy
face a set of coordinating institutions whose character is not fully under their
control. These institutions offer firms a particular set of opportunities; and
companies can be expected to gravitate towards strategies that take advantage of
these opportunities. … Our approach predicts systematic differences in corporate
strategy across nations, and differences that parallel the overarching structures of
the political economy.’7
In more recent empirical work, Hall and Gingerich10 have elaborated on the
implications of this for institutions. They examine first of all the degree to which
institutions in particular societies cohere around either market coordination or,
what they term in the paper, ‘strategic coordination’. They find strong correlations
across different spheres indicating that societies tend to lie closer to one of the
two ends of the market-strategic coordination dimension. They then test whether
those societies lying closest to the ‘pure’ type of either market or strategic
coordination perform better in economic terms than do societies nearer the middle
(i.e. mixing the two different modes of coordination). Their overall conclusion
is that the greater the degree of institutional coherence and complementarity (at
either end of the dimension) the higher the growth rate. The lower the degree of
institutional complementarity the lower the growth rate. The message for analysts
and policy makers is clear. Change should be ‘path dependent’ and based on a
recognition of the importance of complementarities. Changes to single institutions
are likely to undermine these complementarities and therefore do more harm than
good. Reform and institutional change is likely to be more effective if it is
incremental as any attempt to institute ‘path breaking’ change is likely to lead to
loss of performance. In this model, institutions are ‘strong’; they provide
unambiguous messages to actors about the rules of the game and, if these are
transgressed, strong sanctions (economic, reputational) come into play that pull
actors back from their deviance. Conformity is rewarded and experimentation
punished. Firms in this model are the passive recipients of institutional constraints.
If they fail to play by the rules of the game, they will perish.
However, this approach is challenged by globalization, which complicates the
picture. Both LME and CME economies are put into crisis by globalization. CMEs
find themselves out-competed by firms from Asia where costs are cheaper and
quality is nearly as high. Thus, some manufacturing tends to move out of the core
CME economies into Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and China.
CMEs face the problem of continually speeding up incremental innovation at the
same time as holding labour costs down, increasing flexibility where possible and
continuing to improve skill levels. The state, in particular, becomes the site of
these problems, both in terms of legislative reform and in terms of balancing the
budget for welfare and pensions in contexts where tax returns are increasingly
politicised and subject to criticism.11–13 LMEs find that low end manufacturing
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production cannot be sustained given the competition from Asian economies and
increasingly the potential for relocation has moved up the value chain – into
banking activities, software production, document production and now research
and development. This is where the policy issues become acute. Should societies
respond by trying to strengthen their already existing core assets or should they
open themselves up to new experimental forms of organization? In the next
section, I explore the theoretical underpinnings of this second ‘mongrel’ model
before returning to the policy issues in the final section of the paper.
Beyond the pedigree model
Rethinking firms
In terms of actors, I emphasize the idea of the firm as an actor drawing particularly
on recent Penrosian inspired theories of the firm.16 To begin with, let us note that
firms exist in relatively strong selection environments – i.e. markets, both financial
and product markets. Failure to perform successfully in these markets threatens
the existence of the firm. Economists and others have sought to understand how
firms survive in such contexts. One tradition represented in the work of Michael
Porter is that firms find ways to create a singular position in the market often by
setting barriers to entry to other firms. As it has become increasingly difficult to
maintain entry barriers in an era of globalization, deregulation and free markets,
there has been a shift from an interest in mechanisms of market protection to an
interest in how the firm develops unique assets that provide it with the capability
to produce new products and services in ways required by consumers. This
approach emphasizes that the firm has to use its existing assets in new ways in
order continually to stay ahead of competition. The firm is always moving forward
and developing, rather than protecting, markets. The result is a focus on firm
innovation and experimentation. Increasingly, researchers have linked this to
the idea of networks, i.e. dense connections with other firms that provide the
possibility of cooperation and thereby the leveraging of existing assets into new
capabilities.17–21 This strand of research, therefore, emphasizes that the firm is not
a passive recipient of institutional constraints but, on the contrary, is in a dynamic
relationship with its broad environment in the search to survive and grow by
developing new assets and capabilities. So how does the firm relate to institutions
and institutional constraints?
In its search for new resources, the firm does not simply accept institutional
constraints. Rather, it looks to find new ways to develop its capacities and by
implication this may lead away from the existing dominant rules of the game. This
can occur in a number of ways. First, the firm may look to what institutional
advantages it might accrue from locating parts of its business overseas in other
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settings where different combinations of institutions become relevant, e.g. a
European firm accessing US capital markets or a US firm accessing techniques
of ‘diversified quality production’ by entering Germany. Two main effects emerge
from this. First, firms learn new practices in other institutional contexts, which
they may bring back to their home base – a process labelled ‘reverse
diffusion’.22–24 This potentially changes the relationship the firm has with other
actors in its national context and may give rise to new practices in the home
context. Secondly, when multinationals enter into new contexts, they may bring
new practices that affect both their own subsidiary and also their local context,
e.g. through their impact on local suppliers, on local training systems, on local
industrial relations etc. Thus, firms are not locked into a single institutional
context.25 On the contrary, they look for new advantages that can be gained from
going elsewhere. In doing so, they increase variety both in the host and the home
context. It is likely that the more multinationals there are based in an economy
and the more multinational subsidiaries there are located there, the greater the
diversity of firm practices will become. This diversity acts as a lesson or a guide
for other firms, further decreasing the homogeneity of firm practices and the
dominance of the home institutional context (see for example the impact of
the entry of Japanese firms on supply chains in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s).26
However, firms do not just learn new ways of doing things from international
experience. They may also identify different tracks within their home context.
This is most obviously the case with the diversity of different regional experiences
that may exist in particular contexts. Regions also can vary in terms of the nature
and degree of their coordination mechanisms and how this is supported by broader
political and social identities.27–29 Finally, firms can develop new ways of working
by picking up on discarded institutional legacies that yet retain some legitimacy
and power in the contemporary context. Crouch1 offers an example in an
explanation of the shift in the UK from a form of mild corporatism during the
1970s to a free market model under Thatcherism. He points out that free market
liberalism had a long tradition in the UK and, although it had declined as a political
force in the 1960s and 1970s, there were important political actors seeking to
revive it from the 1970s. Thus, Thatcher was able to build on a renewed and
revived legacy of market economies in the 1980s. Similarly, Djelic and Quack
have identified the coexistence of ordo-liberalism (with its emphasis on the
market) and coordinated capitalism in Germany since the 1800s. They argue that
there has been a consequent fluctuation historically and institutionally in terms
of the dominance of either of these approaches.30
What we can observe from these processes is that firms have the opportunity
to pursue a diversity of approaches in their fight against the strong selection
environment and this diversity has increased as a result of globalization and the
ability of MNCs to move across national boundaries. The result is likely to be a
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growing divergence within national contexts. On the one hand, there will be those
firms that have developed in ways that loosen their connection with the dominant
institutions and make them more a complex amalgam of various skills and
capabilities drawn from a number of settings. They will be linked in particular
local, regional and global networks of cooperation and supply that go beyond any
one national system, a necessary change in order to build a globally competitive
advantage in particular sectors. On the other hand, there will be those firms that
have remained locked within a particular institutional setting with very little
involvement in global flows of knowledge, people and capital. In other words,
what we can predict is a growing diversity of firm structures and strategies within
national systems and therefore a growing tension over the degree to which national
institutions can and should constrain action.
Rethinking institutions
As can be seen from this discussion, a key problem is how we conceive of
institutions. Here there are a number of arguments that need to be made in contrast
to the ‘pedigree’ approach. The first is that institutions are not to be analysed in
functional, teleological terms. It is important to ask where they come from and
this leads into an analysis of politics and contingent ‘events’ (wars and revolutions,
most spectacularly but also the confluence and connection of different strands
of causality.31,32) In this view, institutions represent a compromise between
social actors that has become an established way of doing things.33 Within
this compromise, some actors gain at the expense of others. Therefore, the
compromise may be subjected to pressure when circumstances change and, for
example, one group perceives itself becoming stronger and therefore capable of
challenging the compromise. This perspective can enlighten the current arguments
in Germany about the nature of the social compromise. Where owners and
managers feel stronger due to their ability to relocate outside the German system
or gain funds from capital markets in new ways, then they become less ready to
accept old agreements about how jobs, rewards and representation rights should
be organized. They become more likely to challenge this and look for their own
company solution rather than adhering to corporatist norms (Lane34). In turn,
employees look for ways to resist this and use their existing institutional position
to rebuild their eroding power (see Yamamura and Streeck35). Thus, institutional
reform is a political battle, not simply a technical and neutral mode of restructuring
firm relations, nor a predetermined path-dependent response to external change.
This point can be reinforced if we secondly turn to the issue of institutions
themselves and more particularly the question of institutional complementarity.
The ‘pedigree’ approach has a strong view on institutions and institutional
complementarity. As described in the previous discussion, it is less interested in
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issues of historical formation and political action and more in the idea that
societies evolve a functionally useful set of complementary institutions that drive
increasing returns. Here the basic problem is that the model overestimates the
degree to which societies develop complementary institutions to the exclusion of
any other type of institutions. One reason for being sceptical about this argument
is that institutions tend to exist in weak selection environments. There is no
ultimate arbiter of whether an institution should cease to exist. Institutions
accrue actors who become committed to their continuance by virtue of what the
institutions actually deliver to them. Such actors may need strong persuasion if
they are asked to reform or get rid of the institution for some postulated greater
good. This is why institutional change is primarily a matter of politics (and the
political balance of forces), and not a matter of economics (and efficiency). As
a result, institutions tend to linger rather than disappear, thus making them possible
resources in future developments. Thus, institutional change is less likely to occur
through wholesale reform and more likely to appear through often unconscious
and for a time, invisible, processes. Streeck and Thelen12 refer to this processes
in terms of layering, drift, conversion, displacement and exhaustion. In Amable’s
terms,8 particular institutions may no longer be part of the dominant institutional
hierarchy in a society but they still survive in a truncated or changed form. Thus,
the more interesting question is to consider how, over time, institutions tend to
move out of this dominant hierarchy and become peripheral or even expendable
as far as most actors are concerned (see the studies in Streeck and Thelen.12) Thus,
societies are likely to be characterised by a long tail of partially embedded
institutions, some of which have moved from the institutional centre to the
periphery, others of which never became fully established but were given enough
of a life to keep ticking over after the initial flush of enthusiasm for their
establishment has long passed. These partially embedded institutions may be
picked up and developed by actors looking for new ways of doing things. This
reinforces the idea that societies are much more complex in institutional terms than
can be understood using a strong model of institutional complementarities (which
assumes that other institutions are ‘selected out’ and disappear because they are
not ‘functional’ to the economic system).
If we allow for the fact that there may be institutions in a society that are not
particularly complementary to the core set then we raise a number of questions.
First, we historicise the question of institutional complementarities; i.e. we can
ask how did these particular complementarities come about? Were they
purposively created or were they the outcome of unexpected linkages and
reinforcement processes? What happened to institutions that did not end up
being complementary? Were they destroyed or did they remain present on the
periphery? Secondly, we can conceive of societies that vary in structure from
tightly complementary to loosely complementary. An interesting example here is
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Japan. Japan is frequently characterized as a system with high levels of
complementarities between its institutions, leading to the creation of the Japanese
mode of the firm identified with high levels of employee commitment, strong
network linkages and long-term planning and investment. And yet this does not
describe Japan per se. Even within the manufacturing sector, there are many small
firms where employment is unstable, rewards are low and the use of skills limited
(see the discussion in Whitley36). This, in fact, raises a different meaning for
complementarity. The small firm sector, organized on much more short-term
principles, actually enables the large firm sector to work because when there are
downturns the big firms pass the consequences on to the small firms who bear the
brunt of the contraction and have to lay off workers. The big firms on the other
hand are able to retain their employees and reinforce the lifetime employment
system. The two areas are complementary not in that they are similar but rather
that they are different (see Crouch1,14). That is why the system works. The Danish
model of ‘flexicurity’, combining a liberal market principle of high employment
flexibility with a coordinated market principle of high welfare security, also
reflects this linking of two different principles in a new way (see Campbell et al.13).
Japan also illustrates other problems with the assumption of a tight national
integration of institutions. It is frequently remarked that the Japanese service and
retail sectors are very poorly performing as is their agriculture and the public
sector. Agriculture, for example, as in many countries, remains a protected sphere
due to political interests in the preservation of the distinct role of the land in
Japanese culture. It has not been rationalized or made complementary to the big
firm sector (see Pempel37 for an excellent analysis of the complexities and
contradictions of the so-called ‘Japanese system’). In comparison, this has been
the case in the UK and the US though not in many European counties as debates
over the Common Agricultural Policy within the EU continuously reveal. In other
words, we have to be very careful about imputing a single logic to a system.
Indeed, we could expect that as societies seek to increase their degree of
integration and complementarity, there would, for at least a transitional period,
be an increase in actors resisting this process and struggling to retain their
particular autonomy from the wider context. An example of this might be
education (see for example the discussion in Brown et al.38). In European
countries, school and university education has been closely associated with the
development of citizens in nation-states. In some countries, this also became
closely tied to the development of skilled workers, but in other contexts, most
obviously the UK, this link was of limited significance. From the 1960s, the school
teaching profession embraced various philosophies of education that were much
more concerned with the ‘development of the whole child’ than with issues of
production. From the 1970s, when the British Prime Minister, Jim Callaghan,
launched what he described as the Great Education Debate, there has been
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continuous reform of the school system aimed at creating a new generation of
productive workers rather than informed citizens. This has been a protracted
struggle between actors at various levels of the education system. The point is that,
in the UK, this system had, in a sense, become increasingly autonomous and
separate from the economic sector. Governments have tried to bring this
institutional set-up more closely into a positive relationship with firms and skill
development but this has been a complex process.
These considerations suggest that we are likely to find, once we move from
abstraction to empirical research, that there is no single logic in a society but a
series of different logics sustained by local and regional conditions, by sectoral
differentiation, and by social and political factors (e.g. the degree of cohesion in
particular societies). Sometimes these different logics become complementary in
the sense of being different but reinforcing. Sometimes these logics may be
similar. Sometimes these logics may become relatively autonomous and deemed
irrelevant to economic issues. This is a matter of empirical research rather than
a necessary assumption.
In conclusion, institutions are not capable of strongly binding actors to single
logics of action. They are, in themselves, contested and liable to be undermined
or reconstructed from the inside. The stability of an institution may be an
indication of its strength to bind but deeper analysis is required to understand how
this stability is constructed and what factors might be capable of undermining it.
Even complementarity can suggest difference rather than similarity. It can be
argued that societies derive much of their capacity for renewal and change from
the fact that they have institutions and logics that pull in different ways and can
therefore be recombined in new ways in response to external and internal change
processes. In such a context, actors face different principles and can use this to
give themselves more flexibility in particular contexts. Societies consist of an
array of institutions that reflect historical processes of development and change.
Although in terms of power such institutions may vary greatly, they still provide
the possibility for diversity, change and experimentation. In sum, institutions are
diverse and multi-levelled and actors can use this to develop their own distinctive
trajectories.
Striving for prosperity: beyond national models
The pedigree model suggests the importance to policymakers of ensuring
coherence and consistency in institutional change. From this perspective, reforms
that do not reflect the dominant logic of the model will fail and lead to confusion
and decline. However, when we dig deeper it becomes clear that societies are not
so coherent, actors are not so passive and institutions are not so strong. Societies
represent, to varying degrees, mongrel patterns of institutional development. From
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a historical perspective, it is clear that the nation-state building process that
characterized the European economies (plus the US and Japan) in the 19th century
was, to a significant degree, concerned to create ‘pedigrees’ (see Mann39). These
were to be national systems that fitted together and where ‘deviant’ patterns were
dispelled. A common approach across a wide range of institutions was to be
established mainly by the coordinated action of governments and the ruling elites.
As history shows, in many European countries, this gave rise in the inter-war years
to fascist movements intent on the compulsory destruction of deviant groups in
order to purify the nation in this search for unity of purpose. The Second World
War and its Cold War aftermath effectively purged European nation-states of the
more extreme features of these ‘system’ like qualities, although earlier patterns
continued to have an influence in the organization of economic affairs (see for
example Bendix40). Thus, most of the advanced industrial countries entered the
post-war era with an underlying logic of social organization, reorganized in
the defeated Axis powers but nevertheless showing remarkable continuity with
the previous period of nation building. Post 1945, what Ruggie41 describes as
‘embedded liberalism’, which restricted the movement of capital whilst allowing
open trade in most manufacturing products, enabled national policy makers to
continue to think in terms of ‘national models’, even if the reality in most countries
was much greater diversity and uncertainty. From the 1980s, onwards, however,
the speed and nature of the flows of capital, technology, people and knowledge
through open borders has prompted a huge debate on what this means for the
nation-state.42–45
Where does this leave our concern with striving for prosperity in Europe and
policymaking? As an empirical question, we need to understand whether
European societies are becoming more diverse in terms of models of economic
organization, types of firms and institutional structures or are they becoming more
homogeneous? I suspect that any detailed empirical examination will reveal the
former rather than the latter. The point, however, is not that dominant models are
disappearing but that they are surrounded by more diverse possibilities than
previously and this changes the calculation of governments, individual actors and
firms when they face new challenges. The result is that where there have been very
dominant and distinctive models, we are likely to see them engaged in complex
and conflictual relations with new and emerging actors. Part of this conflict may
occur because certain actors want to go back to the ‘pedigree’ model and squeeze
diversity out of the system by top down control. However, their ability to achieve
this in contexts of open borders that allow actors to move around and engage in
‘regime shopping’ makes it unlikely that this model could ever succeed again.
Does this mean that the ‘market’ has won and that coordinating institutions with
their emphasis on corporatist negotiation will decline in order that flexible markets
in labour and capital can emerge? This is not the lesson at all. The lesson is, on
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the contrary, the need to sustain the institutions that have served European
economies well in the past but sustain them in ways which allow change, diversity
and recombination by individual actors and firms. Indeed there are some reasons
for being cautiously optimistic about the European response to globalization and
about the underlying ability to continue to out-compete other countries precisely
because of the deep embedding of social institutions. Of course, there is an element
of lock in and sunken assets that makes wholesale change difficult. But this is not
really how change is occurring. It is not that societies are remodelling themselves
from the top but rather that economic actors are taking new opportunities and in
the process reshaping their local institutional environments. This process is most
clearly seen in small societies in particular, which seem to have built the
cooperative institutions that enable actors to reflect and reach new agreements
about the sorts of reforms required (see Katzenstein’s original small states theory46
and subsequent discussions in Campbell et al.13 concerning Denmark, and Becker
and Schwartz47 comparing small European states to Germany and the US). It is
also seen in regions that have evolved shared institutions and identities that
facilitate change and innovation rather than simply reproduction. The sorts of
dialogues, debates and cooperation that occur in regions and small states are much
more difficult to achieve at the national level in large societies where the
complexities of interest group formation and political representation reduce
the potential for change. Even stasis at this level, however, does not necessarily
crush local efforts at restructuring and change. These sorts of communicative
capacities to create new responses to problems have been labelled as characteristic
features of ‘institutional competitiveness.’48 In this model, the emphasis is not on
any particular patterns of economic organization or firms as being what creates
competitiveness but on the ability of a society continually to experiment and
introduce new ways to solve problems. This capacity is embedded in the
institutions that have created the consensual means to dynamically search for new
solutions.
Striving for prosperity in Europe in these new conditions is therefore unlikely
to be a matter of reproducing national pedigree models. Even if there was a golden
age when such models were accurate descriptively and effective normatively that
period has gone. Diversity has been re-introduced into national systems and new
challenges arise from this to create a new economic, social and political
settlement. All social settlements can be described as forms of compromise
building between the more powerful and wealthy segments of a society and the
less powerful but usually more numerous sections. If European societies are to
move towards a new form of prosperity, they face this task again in a new
environment where their population and their economy is much more diverse and
heterogeneous than previously, making it more difficult to build institutions
through consensus but even more necessary.
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So what role is the European Union able to take in this process? The first mildly
optimistic prognosis is that the EU in its various Framework Programmes has
been influential in creating linkages across different societies and in this way
allowing learning effects to occur. This in turn increases the possibility of the sorts
of creative experimentation with new and hybrid models of production and
services that offer the potential for innovation and growth in the knowledge
economy. Secondly, the EU focus on regions, the open method of coordination
and the building up of intellectual assets through mobility amongst researchers
has similar positive effects as does the provision of funds for structural adjustment
and development in poorer regions. So the EU can facilitate diversity and
experimentation.
For both the EU and national governments, however, the obvious problem
concerns those groups and sectors that are left behind and the impact of this on
the wider society. The corporatist bargain that seems to hold most groups in small
states together is always more tentative in large societies such as Germany. As
individual and family fortunes get tied more closely to the firms in which people
work and the global competitiveness of these firms, there will be increased
differentiation within society in terms of financial rewards and career
development. Many less skilled employees will be trapped in employment that
offers low wages, poor conditions of work and limited job security. Increasingly
it appears that these workers will be migrants from new entrants to the European
Union, thus reinforcing internal diversity within societies. As a result, cities such
as London and Paris become even more divided as the high rewards of
employment in financial and professional services go hand in hand with a vast
number of poorly paid workers in the personal services industries – hotels,
cleaners, shop workers, fast foods, transport, hospitals etc. The social tensions that
emerge from this juxtaposition reveal themselves in crime, illegal immigration
and potential conflict between ethnically divided communities. In this context,
sustaining and building welfare states, corporatism and the necessary levels of
personal and corporate taxation becomes increasingly problematic from an
economic point of view, whilst increasingly necessary from a political viewpoint.
Can societies achieve ‘institutional competitiveness’ whilst facing such dramatic
challenges? In conclusion, the idea that there are national models of capitalism
that define the ways in which governments and firms act is looking untenable
theoretically and increasingly unrealistic as the basis for policy-making. I have
proposed in this paper that societies are becoming more diverse and the question
now is how to use this diversity productively. I suggest that there are two possible
routes for European societies in these circumstances.
The first involves embedding employees in global markets through their
positions in MNCs by virtue of their distinctive knowledge assets. Thus, states
improve education and training, establish world class universities and encourage
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inward investment. The result is that prosperity will come less from being a citizen
with rights to employment and security and more from being an employee in a
global firm. This then raises the question of whether such prosperity will be spread
from those firms and regions that have strong positions in the global economy into
other parts of the society or into other parts of the EU where these global firms
are absent or small in number. Here is where the real dilemma lies. Efforts to create
whole societies of globally competitive economic actors may have a chance in
small societies like Finland but in larger societies this is unlikely to happen, and
achieving this across all the diverse EU states including the latest entrants is even
more difficult. Thus, institutions remain key to economic prosperity but many
people without skills and knowledge are left out, having to take poorly paid and
insecure jobs in a context where public welfare regimes have been reduced or have
never been well developed.
The alternative also requires investment in education and skills but not just
technical skills. It requires an education in civic institutions and an encouragement
towards sociality, cooperation, networks, creativity and innovation, characteris-
tics that other economies, outside Europe, find difficulty reproducing however
well they can develop engineering and mathematical skills. It requires ensuring
that the public sphere is legitimate, active, participatory and involving rather
than corrupt, torpid, and dominated by self-reproducing elites. It requires the
resources for individuals and firms to experiment and innovate without fear that
failure will be final and disastrous. Above all it requires the capacity for public
debate about change and public will to implement the outcome of such debates
even in contexts where strong disagreements remain. This is the real meaning of
‘institutional competitiveness’ – a continued capacity to analyse, change and
innovate at the level of the society not just the firm. Political scientists have
identified that democratic politics is often about short-term decision-making
spurred on by the accidents and emergencies of history and the thought that
an election is just around the corner. They have, however, also argued that where
‘the shadow of the future’ can be made palpable to politicians, there can be
long-term decision-making which enables credible commitments to be made,
foregoing current rewards in the hope of long-term benefit. The ‘shadow of
history’, in the sense of the potential displacement of European economic
prosperity, is now hanging over us. The temptation, most obviously in the UK,
but also in other European countries is to go at least partly down the American
route – to leave people to find their own position in an unequal economic system
and to give up on the creation of ‘institutional competitiveness’ capacities in the
society as a whole. As can be seen in the USA (and to a degree, the UK), this
can lead to very high levels of personal wealth and income for the few, very
comfortable standards of living for a middle class dependent on well-paid
jobs in corporations, professions and to a lesser degree public services, and a
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substantial population which is insecure and in many cases impoverished. This
in turn leads to reduced participation in elections, pork barrel politics in the
legislature, a general cynicism about political actors, high levels of crime and a
divided society. The hope for European societies is that they take the other turn
– reviving political culture, building new mechanisms of participation and
creating a new form of institutional competitiveness out of diversity and
difference. Whether that can be achieved is the challenge faced by European
politicians and policy-makers. In the meantime, academics also face a challenge
– to drop outdated models and confront the new complexity. In this paper, I have
tried to take a step in that direction.
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